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Abstract. Peer production projects such as Wikipedia or open-source
software development allow volunteers to collectively create knowledge-
based products. The inclusive nature of such projects poses difficult chal-
lenges for ensuring trustworthiness and combating vandalism. Prior stud-
ies in the area deal with descriptive aspects of peer production, failing to
capture the idea that while contributors collaborate, they also compete
for status in the community and for imposing their views on the product.
In this paper, we investigate collaborative authoring in Wikipedia, where
contributors append and overwrite previous contributions to a page. We
assume that a contributor’s goal is to maximize ownership of content
sections, such that content owned (i.e. originated) by her survived the
most recent revision of the page. We model contributors’ interactions
to increase their content ownership as a non-cooperative game, where a
player’s utility is associated with content owned and cost is a function
of effort expended. Our results capture several real-life aspects of con-
tributors interactions within peer-production projects. Namely, we show
that at the Nash equilibrium there is an inverse relationship between
the effort required to make a contribution and the survival of a con-
tributor’s content. In other words, majority of the content that survives
is necessarily contributed by experts who expend relatively less effort
than non-experts. An empirical analysis of Wikipedia articles provides
support for our model’s predictions. Implications for research and prac-
tice are discussed in the context of trustworthy collaboration as well as
vandalism.
Index Terms-Peer production, Wikipedia, collaboration, non-cooperative game, trust-
worthy collaboration, vandalism
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen the emergence of a web-based peer-production model for
collaborative work, whereby large numbers of individuals co-create knowledge-
based goods, such as Wikipedia, and open source software [?], [?], [?], [?], [?],
[?], [?]. Increasingly, individuals, companies, government agencies and other or-
ganizations rely on peer-produced products, stressing on the need to ensure trust
worthiness of collaboration (e.g., deter vandalism) as well as the quality of end
products.
Our focus in this study is Wikipedia, probably the most prominent example
of peer-production. Wikipedia has become one of the most popular information
sources on the web, and the quality of Wikipedia articles has been the topic of
recent public debates. Wikipedia is based on wiki technology. Wiki is a web-
based collaborative authoring tool that allows contributors to add new content,
append existing content, or delete and overwrite prior contributions. Wikis track
the history of revisions similarly to version control systems used in software
development allowing users to revert a wiki page to an earlier revision [?], [?],
[?].
Peer production projects face a key tension between inclusiveness and qual-
ity assurance. While such projects need to draw in a large group of contributors
in order to leverage “the wisdom of the crowd,” there is also requirement for
accountability, security, and quality control [?], [?], [?]. Quality assurance mea-
sures are necessary not only in cases of vandalism; conflicts between contributors
could also result from competition. For example, contributors to Wikipedia may
wrestle to impose their own viewpoints on an article especially for controversial
topics or attempt to dominate subsets of the peer-produced product. Another
example is when contributors seeking status within the community compete to
make the largest contribution, and in the process overwrite others’ previous con-
tributions. The result of such competitions is often “edit wars” where articles
are changed back-and-forth between the same contributors.
Prior studies investigating an individual’s motivation for contributing con-
tent to Wikipedia have identified a large number of motives driving participa-
tion[?],[?], including motives that are competitive in nature, such as ego, reputa-
tion enhancement, and the expression of one’s opinions [?], [?]. However, studies
investigating individuals did not consider the competitive dynamics emerging
from motives such as reputation. Research into group interactions at Wikipedia,
have tended to emphasize the collaborative (rather than competitive nature of in-
teractions) [?]. Other studies investigated threats to security and trustworthiness
resulting from malicious attacks (i.e. vandalism)[?] and the organizational mech-
anisms used by Wikipedia to combat such attacks [?]; yet these studies do not
consider threats resulting from benevolent contributors. A relevant strand of the
literature has looked at conflicts of opinions between contributors [?], [?]. How-
ever, the focus is on the result of these conflicts on content quality rather than
the competitive mechanisms driving them. In summary, while peer-production
projects, and in particular Wikipedia, have attracted significant attention within
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the research community, to the best of our knowledge, the competitive dynamics
have not been investigated.
In order to better understand collaboration in Wikipedia and capture the
competitive nature of interactions, we turn to game theory. Our underlying as-
sumption is that a contributor’s goal is to maximize ownership of content sec-
tions, such that content “owned” (i.e. originated) by that user survived the most
recent revision of the page. We model contributors’ interactions to increase their
content ownership, as a non-cooperative game. A contributor’s motivation for
trying to maximize her ownership within a certain topical page could be based
on the need to express one’s views or to increase her status in the community;
and competition could be the result of battles between opposing viewpoints (e.g.
vandals and those seeking to ensure trustworthiness of content) or consequences
of power struggles. The utility of each contributor in the non-cooperative game
is the ownership in the page, defined as the fraction of content owned by the
contributor in the page. Each contributor suffers a cost of contribution which is
the effort expended towards making the contribution. The objective is then to
determine the optimal strategies, i. e., the optimal number of contributions made
by each contributor, so that her net utility is maximized. Here, the net utility
is the difference between the utility (a measure of the ownership) and the cost
(a measure of the effort expended). The optimal strategies are determined by
determining the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game that models the
interactions between the contributors. We determine the conditions under which
the Nash equilibrium of the game can be achieved and find its implications on
the contributors’ expertise levels on the topic. We report of an empirical analy-
sis of Wikipedia that validates the model’s predictions. The key results brought
forth by our analysis include
– The ownership of contributors increases with the decreasing levels of effort
expended by the contributor on the topic.
– Contributors expending equal amount of effort end up with equal ownership.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The non-cooperative game that
models the interactions between contributors is described in Section 2. We then
use Wikipedia data to validate the modeling in Section 3. We then discuss in
Section 4 the relevance of our analysis and modeling to trust worthy collaboration
and vandalism. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5 along with pointers to future
directions.
2 User Contribution as a Non-Cooperative Game
We model the interactions of the N content contributors to a page (i.e., users)
as a non-cooperative game. The strategy set for each contributor is the amount
and type of contribution she makes. Table 1 describes the notations used in our
analysis. and their descriptions.
Let xi represent the content owned by the i
th user in the current version of
the page. We define the utility, ui, as the fraction of content owned by the i
th
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Table 1. Variables used in the analysis in this paper.
Notation/Variable Description
N Number of users or content contributors
xi The amount of content owned by the i
th user
βi Effort expended by user i to make unit contribution
ui The fractional ownership held by the i
th user
ni Net utility of contributor i
1 The all-one vector
I The identity matrix
contributor, and is given by
ui =
xi∑N
j=1 xj
. (1)
The objective of contributor i is to determine the optimal xi so that ui is max-
imum.
It is observed from (1) that the optimal xi that maximizes ui is xi = ∞.
This is because the utility function is an increasing function of xi. Intuitively,
this result occurs because every time the ith user makes a contribution, his/her
ownership increases. However this results in reduction in the ownership of other
contributors, to counter which, they attempt to make additional contributions
(by increasing their respective xk’s). This, in turn, reduces the ownership of con-
tributor i, thereby causing him/her to further increase xi to increase ownership.
This process continues ad infinitum resulting in xi → ∞, ∀ i. This degenerate
scenario can be mitigated as follows.
Suppose the ith contributor expends an effort, βi, to make a unit contribu-
tion. For instance, βi can be the cost incurred by the i
th user, in terms of time
and effort spent in learning the topic and in posting content on a Wiki page.
Therefore, the ith contributor expends a total effort βixi, to achieve xi amount
of content ownership in the page. The net utility experienced by the ith contrib-
utor, ni, can be written as the difference between utility of contributor i, given
by (1) and the total effort expended by contributor i, i. e.,
ni = ui − βixi = xi∑N
j=1 xj
− βixi. (2)
It is observed that the net utility obtained by the ith contributor not only de-
pends on the strategy of the ith contributor (i.e., xi), but also on the strategies
of all the other contributors (i.e., xj , j 6= i). This results in the non-cooperative
game of complete information [?] between the contributors. The optimal xi,
∀ i (termed as x∗i ), which is determined by maximizing ni in (2), is then the
Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game where no contributor can make
a unilateral change.
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Applying the first order necessary condition to (2), x∗i is obtained as the
solution to
∂ni
∂xi
∣∣∣
xi=x∗i
=
∑
N
k=1
k 6=i
x∗k(∑
N
j=1
x∗
j
)
2 − βi = 0, ∀i (3)
subject to the constraints x∗i ≥ 0, ∀ i. From (3), we obtain ∂
2ni
∂x2
i
= −
2
∑
N
k=1
k 6=i
xk(∑
N
j=1
xj
)
3 <
0, ∀ i, when xi ≥ 0. Thus, ni is a concave function of xi and x∗i , which solves
(3) subject to x∗i ≥ 0, ∀ i, is a local as well as a global maximum point. In other
words, according to [?], the non-cooperative game has a unique Nash equilibrium,
x∗ =
[
x∗1 x
∗
2 · · · x∗N
]T
, obtained by numerically solving the system of N non-
linear equations specified by (3). However, to study the effect of the effort levels
(βi’s) on the strategies of the contributors, it is desirable to obtain an expression
that relates the vectors, x∗, x = [xi]1≤i≤N and β = [βi]1≤i≤N .
Re-writing (3),
(∑N
j=1 x
∗
j
)2
− αi
∑N
j=1
j 6=i
x∗j = 0, ∀N, (4)
where αi
△
= 1/βi. Eqn. (4 ) can be written as
(x∗)T 11Tx∗1−Dα
(
11T − I)x∗ = 0, (5)
where (.)T represents the transpose of a vector or a matrix, Dα is the diagonal
matrix diag (α1, α2, · · · , αN ), 1 is the column vector in which all entries are one,
0 is the column vector in which all entries are zero and I is the identity matrix.
It can be easily verified the vectors, y1 =
[
1√
N
1√
N
1√
N
1√
N
· · · 1√
N
]T
and
for j = 2, 3, · · ·, N , yj =
[
y1j y2j y3j · · · y(N−1)j yNj
]T
, where
ykj =


1√
j(j−1) k < j
− j−1√
j(j−1) k = j
0 k > j,
(6)
form a set of orthonormal eigen vectors to the matrix, 11T . The eigen value
corresponding to y1 is N and those corresponding to y2, · · · ,yN are 0s. Let
P = [y1|y2| · · · |yN ]. Then, P is an orthogonal matrix and by orthogonality
transformation,
PT11TP = D = diag (N, 0, 0, · · · , 0) . (7)
Let z =
[
z1 z2 z3 · · · zN−1 zN
]T
. Since the eigen vectors of a matrix form a basis
for the N−dimensional sub-space [?], the vector, x∗, can be written as x∗ = Pz.
A similar expression has been solved in [?] in the context of pricing in wireless
networks and we outline here the key steps to determine the optimal x∗.
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– Using x∗ = Pz in (5) and (7), we obtain
zTDz1−Dα
(
11T − I)Pz = 0. (8)
– The above is a set of non-linear equations in z, in which the kth equation
depends on z1 and zj , k ≤ j ≤ N . Solving the non-linear equations by
backward substitution [?], zk, 2 ≤ k ≤ N can be written in terms of z1 as
zk√
k(k − 1) =
Nz21
k(k − 1)

 k
αk
+
N∑
j=k+1
1
αj

− z1√
N
N(N − 1)
k(k − 1) . (9)
– Using (9) to replace all zk’s in terms of z1 in the set of non-linear equations
in (8), z1 can be obtained as
z1 =
N − 1√
N
1
G
, (10)
where
G
△
=
N∑
j=1
1
αj
. (11)
– Combining (9) and (10),
zk√
k(k−1) =
(N−1)2
k(k−1) G
−1
[
G−1
(
k
αk
+
∑N
j=k+1
1
αj
)
− 1
]
2 ≤ k ≤ N. (12)
– Using the facts x∗ = Pz, and αi = 1βi in (10) and (12), the unique Nash
equilibrium of the non-cooperative game can be obtained as
x∗i =
∑N
j=1 βj − (N − 1)βi(∑N
j=1 βj
)2 . (13)
Note that the unique Nash equilibrium x∗, is feasible, i.e., x∗i > 0, ∀ i if and
only if
(N − 1)βi <
N∑
j=1
βj . (14)
The utility (ownership) of contributor i at the Nash equilibrium, u∗i , can then
be obtained from (1) and (13) as,
u∗i =
[
1−
(
(N − 1)βi∑N
j=1 βj
)]+
, (15)
where x+ = max(x, 0). It is observed that the ownership u∗i is non-zero if and
only if (14) is satisfied, i.e., if the Nash equilibrium is feasible. The condition in
(14) and the expression in (15) have the following interesting implications.
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– From (15), the ownership of contributors depend on the βj of all the contrib-
utors. This is intuitively correct in a peer production project like Wikipedia
because contributions are made by multiple users and the ownership held
by a user will depend on the effort of all the users that worked together in
making contributions to the page.
– The expression in (15) indicates that contributors who expend smaller effort
have larger ownership and those who expend larger effort have low ownership,
i.e., the fractional content ownership is a decreasing function of the effort
expended.
– Asymptotically, i.e., as the number of contributors, N , becomes large, the
ownership, u∗i in (15), can be written as
ui∗ =
(
1− βi
E[β]
)+
, (16)
where E[β]
△
= 1
N
∑N
j=1 βj , is the average effort of all the users that make
contributions to the page. From (16), only those contributors for whom βi <
E[β], i.e., only those contributors whose effort is below the average effort
expended in posting content to a page, end up with non-zero ownership. In
other words, given the effort involved in making a contribution, and the ease
in which others can overwrite one’s contributions, only those who expend
less effort in making their contributions than the average effort required,
end up with non-zero ownership.
3 Empirical Validation with Data
While the non-cooperative game theoretic models developed in Section 2 are
based on intuitive notions of ownership and effort, it is necessary to validate
these with real data from contributions to Wikipedia articles. We require a set
of Wikipedia articles with data on: (a) the content “owned” by contributors
at each revision (which can be analogous to the utility, u∗i in (15) and (b) the
cumulative effort exerted by each contributor (including all of his/her contri-
butions) up to each revision, which can represent the effort, βi, used in the
expressions in (12) and (15). We use the data set from Arazy et al [?], who
explored automated techniques for estimated Wikipedia contributors’ relative
contributions. The data set in [?] includes nine articles randomly selected from
English Wikipedia. Each article was created over an average period of 3.5 years.
Section 3.1 presents the details of the data set in [?] and Section 3.2 provides a
validation of the same against the models developed in Section 2.
3.1 Extracting data from Wikipedia Articles
The content “owned” by contributors at the end date of each article period was
calculated using the method described in [?]. A sentence was employed as the
unit of analysis, and each full sentence was initially owned by the contributor
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Table 2. The list of articles for the data set in [?] and their attributes.
Article title Start Date End Date Duration Edits Unique
(MM/DD/YYYY) (MM/DD/YYYY) (years) Editors
Aikodo [?] 11/29/2001 06/13/2004 2.5 72 62
Angel [?] 11/30/2001 12/09/2005 4.0 341 277
Baryon [?] 02/25/2002 08/25/2005 3.5 73 62
Board Game [?] 11/04/2001 12/30/2004 3.2 220 155
Buckminster Fuller [?] 12/13/2001 07/14/2004 2.6 65 55
Center for Disease 10/16/2001 03/05/2006 4.4 65 58
Control and Prevention [?]
Classical Mechanics [?] 06/06/2002 08/13/2006 4.2 202 165
Dartmouth College [?] 10/01/2001 08/26/2004 2.9 70 55
Erin Brockovich [?] 09/24/2001 02/02/2006 4.4 59 54
Total 31.7 1167 943
Average 3.5 129.7 104.8
who added it. As content on a wiki page evolves, a contributor may lose a sen-
tence when more than 50% of that sentence was deleted or revised. A contributor
making a major revision to a sentence can take ownership of that sentence. The
algorithm tracks the evolution of content, recording the number of sentences
owned by each contributor at each revision, until the study’s end date. The ef-
fort exerted by each contributor was, too, based on the method and data set
described in [?]. Two research assistants worked independently to analyze every
“edit” made to the 9 articles in the sample set and record: contributor’s ID;
the type of each “edit” to the wiki page (the categories used included: add new
content, improve navigation, delete content, proofread, and add hyperlink); the
scope of each edit (on a 5-point scale, from minor to major). For example, a
particular edit might be categorized as major addition of new content. The two
assessors reviewed the “History” section of articles (where Wikipedia keeps a
log of all changes to a page), comparing subsequent versions. Once the assessors
completed their independent work, and inter-rater agreement levels were calcu-
lated (yielding very high levels of agreement), the average of the two assessors
was used in the analysis. Finally, the above data set was used to obtain the
following parameters on each Wikipedia article listed in Table 2:
– The number of exclusive contributors/users (N)
– The total effort expended by the ith user (1 ≤ i ≤ N), si
– The number of edits made by the ith user (1 ≤ i ≤ N), ei
– The number of sentences owned by the ith user (1 ≤ i ≤ N), pi.
The following subsection provides a detailed explanation on how we use these
parameters to verify the game theoretic analysis described in Section 2.
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3.2 Numerical verification of the analysis
Using the set of parameters obtained from the pages in Table 2, listed in Section
3.1, we compute the effort expended by user i for unit contribution, βi, as
βi =
si
ei
. (17)
Using the βi’s thus obtained, we use the expression in (15) to determine the
estimated fractional ownership on the Wikipedia page, that will be held by each
contributor. We compare this with the fraction pi∑N
j=1
pj
Figs. 1, 2 and 3 show
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Fig. 1. Ownership of contributors obtained by the game theoretic analysis presented in
Section 2 (described by the legend, “Analysis”) and the data obtained from Wikipedia
pages according to the algorithm in [?] (described by the legend, “JASIST data”),
for the page, “Aikido”. Contributors/Authors are indexed according to the decreasing
order of effort, βi’s.
the comparison between the ownership obtained according to the game theoretic
analysis described in Section 2 and that given by the data set in [?] for the
Wikipedia pages, “Aikido”, “Board Game” and “Erin Brockovich”, respectively.
For this first analysis, we anonymized the data set, indexing the users in the
decreasing order of βis. We find that the patterns in the empirical data and
that of the game-theoretic model closely match one another. In particular, the
empirical data validates the following predictions made by the game theoretic
model in Section 21.
1 These trends were observed not only for the three articles shown in Figs. 1-3 but
also for all the nine articles listed in Table 2. We show results for three articles here
due to lack of space.
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Fig. 2. Ownership of contributors obtained by the game theoretic analysis presented in
Section 2 (described by the legend, “Analysis”) and the data obtained from Wikipedia
pages according to the algorithm in [?] (described by the legend, “JASIST data”), for
the page, “Board Game”. Contributors/Authors are indexed according to the decreas-
ing order of effort, βi’s.
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Fig. 3. Ownership of contributors obtained by the game theoretic analysis presented in
Section 2 (described by the legend, “Analysis”) and the data obtained from Wikipedia
pages according to the algorithm in [?] (described by the legend, “JASIST data”),
for the page, “Erin Brockovich”. Contributors are indexed according to the decreasing
order of effort, βi’s.
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1. Equivalence classes:
(a) Let the users be classified into equivalence classes according to their frac-
tional ownership, i.e., all users having equal fractional ownership in the
Wikipedia page belongs to the same equivalence class. It is observed that
each page has five to six equivalence classes. For instance, Aikido, has five
equivalence classes (Fig. 1) and Board game (Fig. 2) and Erin Brockovich
(Fig. 3), have six equivalence classes each. Note that the number of equiv-
alence classes obtained from the data is the same as that predicted by the
game theoretic analysis described in Section 2.
(b) From (15), u∗i = u
∗
j if and only if β
∗
i = β
∗
j . This indicates that the
distribution of the data into number of equivalence classes applies not
only to fractional ownership, but also to the effort expended by users. In
other words each Wiki page is expected to have five to six categories of
contributors/users. A more detailed analysis of the distribution suggests
that the majority of users fall into the equivalence middle classes, while
the classes on the extreme representing very low and very high levels of
effort (and content ownership) comprise of relatively few users. While the
above can be inferred from the data alone, the game theoretic analysis
provides a mathematical framework that validates this observation.
2. Non-zero ownership: It is observed from (15) that u∗i = 0 if and only if the
condition in (14) is violated. The number of users in our sample data with
zero ownership matches the number predicted by the game-theoretic model
thus providing validation for the condition (14) (at least for the Wikipedia
pages included in our analysis). Again, it is observed that the relation between
the number of users with zero ownership and their corresponding βi’s could
have been inferred from the data alone, the game theoretic analysis presented
in Section 2 provides a mathematical framework to model this phenomenon.
After establishing that the general trend (i.e. anonymized data) for the em-
pirical data and the model’s predictions match one another, we perform a more
detailed analysis where we pay attention to users’ identities. That is, we orga-
nize both data sets, namely the fractional ownership data taken directly from
[?] and the ownership values our model in Section 2 predicted, for each user.
We then calculate the correlation between the two data sets, using the Pearson’s
correlation coefficient [?]. The result of the analysis for the nine articles in our
data set is presented in Fig. 4. As could be seen from the figure, correlation co-
efficients range between 0.47 and 0.88, representing moderate-high correlation.
When combining the entire data from the nine articles into a single data set,
the Pearson correlation was 0.65 (with a p−value, p ≈ 0.04). Therefore, we now
proceed to verify if the discrepancies in the values of the ownership obtained by
the game theoretic analysis and that obtained from the data can be offset by
establishing a linear fit that maps the set of values obtained by analysis to the
ones obtained from the data.
Let a
△
=
[
a1 a2 a3 · · · aN
]
represent the ownership of the contributors ob-
tained by the game theoretic analysis and let d
△
=
[
d1 d2 d3 · · · dN
]
represent
the ownership of the contributors obtained from the data as described in [?]. For
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Fig. 4. Pearson correlation co-efficient between the values of the fractional ownership,
u∗i , obtained from the data in [?] and that obtained by the analysis in Section 2
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Fig. 5. Estimation error for the linear fit by the method of least squares. The values
of the fractional ownership, u∗i , obtained for the pages, “Aikido”, “Angel”, “Baryon”
and “Board Game” are used as training data for the linear fit.
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each page, we fit a function
dˆi = ρai + δ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (18)
where the parameters ρ and δ are obtained by the method of least squares [?].
We use the values for the pages “Aikido”, “Angel”, “Baryon” and “Board Game”
as the training data to obtain ρ and δ. We then use the values of ρ and δ thus
obtained to determine dˆi for the other five pages. We then compare dˆi and di
and compute the estimation error for each page. Fig. 5 shows the estimation
error for the remaining five pages. It is observed that the error is between 7-9%.
The error for the training set of data was found to be around 5%. This indicates
that the game theoretic analysis presented in Section 2 models the contributor
interactions in peer production projects like Wikipedia accurately upto a linear
scaling factor.
4 Trustworthy Collaboration and Vandalism
An important insight provided by our non-cooperative game model (and vali-
dated by our empirical analysis) is that only contributors with below-average
effort levels are able to maintain fractional ownership on wiki pages. That is, by
and large only the edits made by contributors who exert little effort survive the
collaborative authoring process. In Section 1, we referred to two key concerns
that are associated with trustworthy collaboration in peer-production projects:
(a) a risk that non-experts will contribute content of low quality, and (b) a threat
that malicious participants would vandalize Wikipedia pages. In spite of these
serious concerns, the content on Wikipedia articles is generally of high quality
and Wikipedia maintains the status as one of the most reliable sources of infor-
mation on the web [?]. How then, does Wikipedia maintain high-quality content
in the face of threats of low-quality or malicious contributions? Our results can
have important implications for investigation of trustworthy collaboration on
Wikipedia (and more broadly, in peer-production projects). In the sections that
follow, we provide two interpretations of our results that help explain how the
threats highlighted above are mitigated.
1. Trustworthiness/Quality of Wikipedia pages: The first interpretation
of the model and its empirical validation involves the concern of non-expert,
low quality contributions eroding the trustworthiness of peer-produced prod-
uct. This interpretation suggests that low effort is associated with greater
likelihood of content survival due to a skill advantage: contributors who are
experts in their field of contribution expend less effort, and their contribu-
tions are of higher quality [?]. Thus, the effort associated with contribution
is inversely related with its quality and consequently with its likelihood of
survival of subsequent editing.
2. Vandalism: The second interpretation concerns the danger of vandalism ac-
tivities reducing the trustworthiness of the peer-produced products. Since
the underlying Wiki mechanisms allow any editor to easily revert the edits of
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other contributors, the effort involved in vandalistic edits is higher than the
effort of reverting such edits. Thus, high effort is associated with vandalism
and relatively lower effort is linked to correction of vandalism. The game the-
oretic analysis presented in Section 2 predicts that the contributions made
by users expending large effort do not survive the edit process and end up
with zero ownership. Therefore, most vandalistic edits would not survive over
time, as also observed in [?], [?], [?].
In summary, following on the intuition observed in [?], [?], [?], we modeled
competition between players as a non-cooperative game, where a player’s util-
ity is associated with surviving fractional content owned, and cost is a function
of effort exerted. Broader design implications emerging from this interpreta-
tion include the need to make version control mechanisms not only highly us-
able, but also highly open and egalitarian, and accessible to participants in a
peer-production process. In addition, these insights suggest the importance of
concurrent use of other quality control mechanisms, including user-designated
alerts (where users are notified when changes are made to an article, or other
part of the collaboratively-created product); watch lists (where users can track
certain articles); and IP or user blocking in cases where repeated attacks from
the same source are deemed to be acts of vandalism. The combination of these
mechanisms make three important contributions to the trustworthiness of peer-
production projects: first, their existence deter potential vandals; second, they
reduce the costs of identifying and responding quickly to attacks; and third, they
enable users to easily revert the consequences of vandalism .
5 Conclusion
To better understand the success of peer production, we developed a non-cooperative
game theoretic model of the creation of Wikipedia articles. The utility of a con-
tributor was her relative ownership of the peer-produced product that survived
a large number of iterations of collaborative editing. The work presented here
contributes to better understanding of the trustworthiness of peer-production
by
– Solving the game and demonstrating the conditions under which a Nash equi-
librium exists, showing that asymptotically only users with below average
effort would maintain ownership
– Empirically validating the model, demonstrating that only users with be-
low average effort would maintain ownership, as well as showing editors’
equivalence classes
– Offering interpretations and implications for research on trustworthy peer-
production (in terms of expertise and vandalism).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first modeling of user interactions on
Wikipedia as a non-cooperative game. Our analysis points to the benefits of
deploying multiple mechanisms which afford the combination of large-scale and
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low-effort quality control as way to ensure the trustworthiness of products cre-
ated through web-based peer-production. Further research is needed to analyze
the effectiveness of each of these mechanisms, and to address other aspects of
peer production through game theoretic analysis.
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